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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses the use of a market-driven technique – transfer of development 
rights (TDR) – to preserve land from development while guaranteeing the rights of 
property owners. While the technique is often used in the United States, Europe has a 
lot more urgency in land preservation but it is still lagging in the use of market based 
instruments such as the transfer of development rights. 
This paper explores the economic arguments favoring the use of TDR programs, 
discusses the difficulties in implementing these programs in Europe, where command-
and-control regulation has been preferred in land preservation to market-based 
solutions, and presents tentative hypotheses to explain the adoption of TDR programs in 
local communities. Preliminary data collected for TDR programs in Florida supports 
some of the arguments presented and encourages researchers to extend this empirical 
analysis to European countries. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Local governments in Europe and elsewhere are faced with the urgency to preserve 
land as environmentally sensitive areas, agriculture uses, open space and historic 
landmarks. Unfortunately, the expansion of the urban fringes has placed strong 
development pressures on land with noneconomic uses. The difference in monetary 
value between the land’s current use and the development value is very often so large 
that it makes virtually impossible for landowners to resist selling. Although some might 
argue that this is simply the land market working in a competitive manner, it is clear 
that many market decisions do not constitute Pareto improvements. This is frequently 
the case of urban sprawl, loss of highly productive farm land and destruction of unique 
wildlife habitats, environmmentally sensitive areas, and historic buildings. 
The correction of market failures using traditional government regulation such as 
zoning, land acquisition, and eminent domain and condemnation procedures to preserve 
land with such unique characteristics has proven to be extremely expensive, prone to 
legal challenges, and has not lived up to the expectations in accomplishing these 
preservation goals. 
In order to overcome the failure of traditional land use preservation techniques, 
many researchers and practitioners have suggested the adoption of transfer of 
development rights (TDR) programs as a market-based technique with potential 
advantages over command-and-control regulation. The literature reports several success 
stories in the United States (Machemer and Kaplowitz, 2002; Bredin, 2000; Voget, 
1999; Johnston and Madison, 1997), but also in Europe (Micelli, 2002; Renard, 1999). 
The determinants of the adoption of TDR programs have deserved little attention 
from urban economists, land-use planners, and political scientists. This work attempts to 
answer the call made by Feitelson and Lindsey (2001) to identify differences across 
local jurisdictions that may determine the choice to adopt TDR programs.  
The paper explores the economic arguments favoring the use of TDR programs, 
discusses the difficulties in implementing these programs in Europe, where command-
and-control regulation has been preferred in land preservation to market-based solutions 
(Weale, 1999; Feitelson and Lindsey, 2001), and presents tentative hypotheses to 
explain the adoption of TDR programs by local communities. Preliminary data collected 
from TDR programs in Florida support some of the arguments presented and encourage 
researchers to extend this empirical analysis to European countries. 
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 The Concept of Transfer of Development Rights 
 
Property ownership can be described as a bundle of rights, including the right to use, 
the right to exchange, and the right to convert. The transfer of development rights 
(TDR) technique assumes that the development rights of a parcel, as part of the right to 
convert, can be sold and used in another parcel. Although this is not as evident as other 
severable and tradable rights such as water, timber and mining, development rights can 
be transferred. The motivation for the creation of a TDR program is the preservation of 
environmentally sensitive areas, agricultural land, open space, and historic landmarks. 
The typical TDR program involves the landowner of a preservation or sending zone 
(or parcel) selling the development rights (DR) to a developer who will use these rights 
in an area designated as development or receiving zone (or parcel)i. In general, the 
receiving area allows for higher density of construction than the base density 
established by law through density bonuses provided by local governments. This 
becomes the incentive for developers to buy the development rights (Lawrence, 1998). 
The establishment of sending and receiving areas is similar to what is done for all 
growth management plans and should not constitute an additional source of complexity 
in TDR implementation (Machemer, Kaplowitz, and Edens, 1999). 
A variation of TDR programs occurs when the local government creates a TDR 
bank from which developers acquire rights to develop at higher densities and the 
government uses the money to purchase development rights in areas it wishes to protect. 
TDR banks can also help during economic recessions to sustain the price of certificates 
(Lawrence, 1998).  
TDR programs can be voluntary or mandatory. Mandatory TDR programs have the 
advantage of forcing preservation of lands threatened by development, although they 
may generate stronger opposition by landowners. Voluntary programs are less effective, 
but may still be successful if the program design includes the appropriate incentives to 
the TDR market. Development rights (DR) are issued by government and distributed to 
landowners in the preservation areas based on one or several possible criteria (Barrows 
and Prengruber, 1976; Machemer et al., 1999): acreage, previous zoning, unit-for-an-
equivalent-unit, measure of monetary loss (market land values, assessed value, 
difference between market value and restricted value, and difference between 
“maximum restricted value”ii and restricted value under TDR). 
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In a recent survey of four TDR programs in the United States, Johnston and 
Madison (1997) found that credit designation systems in TDR programs employ one or 
a combionation of two or more of these criteria, although the land’s type, location, past 
and present uses, and square footage of buildable space may also play a role in the 
allocation of DR. 
The DR owned by landowners in the sending areas constitute the supply-side of the 
TDR market, whereas the developers wishing to invest in the receiving area form the 
demand-side. The following section presents an economic analysis of TDR, contrasting 
TDR programs with traditional preservation tools, namely zoning, and discussing the 
conditions for the establishment of a competitive TDR market. 
 
Economic Analysis of TDR programs 
 
TDR is thought to be the best technique to preserve these areas, since it is a market-
type transaction involving low costs for the public. It is more effective than zoning in 
the protection of land and landmarks, and it provides compensation to landowners that 
alienate the development rights (Berry and Steiker, 1975). 
The economic analysis argues that TDR programs should be preferred to zoning for 
four reasons. First, TDR programs are market-based alternatives and, therefore, entail 
less administrative costs then zoning (a command-and-control type of regulation). Once 
they are in place, TDR programs require little to no monitoring, since transactions take 
place without government interference. The main administrative costs appear at the 
onset of the program, because it will be necessary to assure proper supply and demand 
of TDR. 
In addition to low preservation costs, TDR programs are likely to produce long 
lasting preservation effects, which make them more reliable instruments in 
accomplishing these goals than traditional zoning. In fact, all TDR deeds should be 
publicly recorded to assure preservation goals (Danner, 1997) and, simultaneously, 
provide information to investors, landowners, developers, builders, and the general 
public to reduce uncertainty costs in market transactions.  
Second, as we argued previously, rezoning decisions frequently involve large rent-
seeking costs, whereas TDR overcomes the market failure and “…increases the net 
benefits of the regulation by better allocating resources across uses” (Thorsnes and 
Simons, 1999). One possible way to preserve agricultural land is to zone for agricultural 
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use only. However, such decision would deprive landowners from the possibility of 
selling to developers and obtaining a reasonable return from their land (Price, 1981). 
Moreover, agricultural zoning indirectly hurts housing affordability, since it restricts the 
supply of land for development driving the price upwards. In contrast, TDR programs 
can redirect development to areas where infrastructure is already available or can be 
extended with significant economies of scale. 
Open space zoning creates even larger rent-seeking costs, with environmentalists 
pushing for zoning and builders and developers opposing it. Taken to the extreme, the 
result of this conflict produces a negative-sum game, because all the rents are dissipated 
in the rezoning process. 
One major issue of concern to the community at large is that the land use plan will 
be constantly changed to serve special interests (Barrows and Prenguber, 1976). TDR 
programs allow for the compensation of landowners, which reduces their economic 
incentives to engage in rent-seeking activities (Thorsnes and Simons, 1999). 
Third, the certificates of development rights can be exchanged in the market and 
provide a compensation to the landowner for the loss of the right to develop (Berry and 
Steiker, 1975). When the DR market is competitive, DRs can be redeemed for an 
adequate price that will exceed the value of the land under agricultural use, but that it 
will also fall short of the most profitable use of the property. However, this is, after all, 
the situation that will occur in most of the land market transactions without TDR. 
Fourth, in communities facing urban sprawl and suffering from pressures to 
develop, the outcome of a TDR program is an efficient market allocation of land to its 
most valued use: the market maximizes the aggregate value of the land (Thorsnes and 
Simons, 1999). Under these circumstances, the TDR market compensates landowners 
for their decision to participate in TDR programs because it will be attractive for 
developers to buy and use DR in the receiving areas. 
For the reasons presented, it would appear that TDR programs are more effective 
than zoning in accomplishing preservation goals, while they allow a more equitable 
distribution of benefits and costs. These distributive implications will be discussed 
further ahead. Next, I turn to the mechanisms underlying the market for DR and 
highlight the conditions that have to be present to secure the success of TDR programs.   
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The Market for Development Rights: Problems and Solutions 
 
The market for development rights (DR) is often plagued with problems that prevent 
exchanges from taking place and fail to provide compensation to landowners that forego 
the development rents. This section identifies some of the problems most commonly 
faced and suggests possible solutions to curtail them. 
The identification of areas for preservation is of crucial importance to determine the 
supply-side of the DR market. The supply of DR is difficult to determine since the 
landowners’ decision to sell depends on the compensation he or she expected if the land 
was developed in the absence of the TDR program (Barrows and Prenguber, 1975). In 
an empirical study conducted in Hadley, Massachussetts, Conrad and LeBlanc (1979) 
found that the agricultural value of the sending area, the age of the landowner and the 
interests of prospective heirs potentially affect the supply of development rights. 
If the number of DR holders is small and the demand is strong, high prices of DR 
can be attained and speculation can become a problem. Higher DR prices have the 
advantage of assuring “fair compensation” of landowners in the preservation area, but 
may increase development costs which can, ultimately, be passed from developers to 
consumers through increased housing prices. This situation is of concern because 
newcomers in the development area can be negatively affected twice: by increased 
densities and increased housing prices. 
Low demand is more likely the product of slow growth in the area covered by the 
program, in which case, landowners in the preservation area would have difficulty 
selling their land for development anyway. When the number of DR is large and 
demand is low, DR holders may decide to hold on to the DR and wait for development 
pressures to increase in order to obtain better compensation for relinquishing them. This 
should not affect owners of a large number of DR, but can create difficulties for small 
landowners, especially if the TDR program is mandatory. For these situations, TDR 
banks can purchase DR to allow landowners to overcome financial stress and sell DR 
for just compensation. 
The literature mentions the possibility of downzoning the receiving areas to force 
developers to acquire DR and, hence, increase their price (Barrows and Prenguber, 
1975). Although this is an attractive solution to improve the TDR market, its application 
is subjected to intense political scrutiny and, ultimately, may not be politically feasible.  
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TDR banks can be a more viable solution, since they balance DR supply and demand to 
enable the program to work successfully (Danner, 1997; Roddewig and Inghram, 1987). 
The establishment of the demand-side of the market depends on a careful choice of 
the development areas. The receiving area should be large enough to avoid the crowding 
out of developers from areas where DR are necessary to build above legally established 
densities, but small enough to generate demand for DR. Metropolitan areas are more 
likely to fulfill these conditions, but large cities should also be adequate. 
Density bonuses allow private developers to buy certain existing zoning restrictions 
(floor area ratio, number of dwelling units, setback requirements, among others) from 
the municipality in exchange for the DR that result from the preservation of the sending 
parcels or areas. Developers are likely to support TDR programs because density 
bonuses allow them to build at higher densities and, therefore, reduce land and site 
development costs and diffuse costs over a larger number of housing units (Municipal 
Research & Services Center, 1992). The provision of density bonuses in the receiving 
areas constitutes a crucial element for the demand-side of the TDR market, because it 
facilitates development in areas with available infrastructure, while avoiding ad-hoc 
zoning variances and up-zoning decisions (Machemer et al., 1999). 
The price at which the community benefits from the preservation of the sending area 
of the TDR program is the price of the DRs to the developer. The economic question 
then becomes to know what is the equilibrium price at which the transaction occurs. 
Theoretically, if the marginal benefits of building at the higher density outweigh the 
marginal costs of the DRs, developers will engage in the exchange. The determination 
of the optimal price, however, is difficult to achieve because local governments can 
only recognize if an incentive was sufficient to engage the developers in the transaction, 
not if it exceeded the optimal price. Additional social costs are imposed when “too 
much” bonus is given to the developers. Seyfried (1991) found that if the internal rate of 
return of the investment exceeds the market rate for similar investments the developer 
will receive a windfall profit, this implying that the bonus is too high for the public 
benefit provided. 
Ultimately, density bonuses may fulfill the less stringent Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
criterion by benefiting a large number of citizens while the inhabitants of the 
neighborhood bear the external costs (Kayden, 1992). However, one needs to keep in 
mind that higher densities place pressure upon public service provision resulting in 
costs in the form of increased taxation for the community as a whole (Rubin, Seneca, 
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and Stotsky, 1990). The authors also argue that, if the area where the incentive is given 
is already densely populated, external costs on the neighborhood in the form of 
congestion and pollution may result.  
 
Distributional Consequences of TDR programs 
 
TDR programs to preserve environmentally sensitive areas and open space have 
distributive consequences for citizens both in the sending and receiving areas. The 
acceptance of market-based instruments and policies by different community interest 
groups is dependent on the way these programs are packaged. If TDR programs are 
proposed along with other coherent policies and having compensation in mind, support 
for these measures is likely to increase (Feitelson and Lindsey, 2001). 
Homeowners near the sending site are most likely supportive of this land use 
management tool because the value of their property is likely to increase in response to 
the amenities apported by the program. In contrast, opposition will come from 
homeowners at the receiving areas, which will face increased development and the 
provision of low and moderate-income housing (Municipal Research & Services Center, 
1992). If the TDR program is established at the municipal level, support and opposition 
will most likely be a zero-sum game. However, if the TDR program is region-wide, 
redistributive consequences across jurisdictions are possible and strong opposition 
likely. 
Property owners in the sending area are more likely to support TDR programs if 
they are voluntary than if they are mandatory. If the program is voluntary, property 
owners can choose either to use their property subject to legal restrictions or to sell the 
development rights. In this case, property owners opt for the solution with the largest 
net benefit, which may impose a higher cost on the jurisdiction and, ultimately, result in 
the development of the property. In contrast, if the program is mandatory all parcels are 
restricted whether the transfer occurs or not (Danner, 1997). Mandatory programs have 
a higher likelihood of success in preserving land and open space, even if they are more 
prone to legal challenges (Daniels, 1991).  
Preservation costs using growth management techniques should be lower because of 
less government intervention. According to Feitelson and Lindsey (2001), the cost-
effectiveness of TDR programs is fairly low, which should make them politically more 
appealing. Even the TDR programs, which involve the creation of TDR banks managed 
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by local and/or state governments, have little cost for the public. TDR banks save on 
transaction costs, since they provide assistance with legal and real estate procedures 
(Danner, 1997).  
When TDR banks are not involved, the development rights of the area to preserve 
(sending area) can be transferred to a designated receiving area at an even lower cost to 
the jurisdiction (Danner, 1997). Local governments are then able to redirect 
development to areas where infrastructure already exists, reduce environmental 
degradation, and protect prime agricultural land (Leo et al., 1998). 
Although preservation costs are small in operating a TDR program, the 
administration is responsible for minimizing transaction costs, which is crucial to the 
success of the program and may entail larger administrative capacity. Ezio Micelli 
points out that TDR programs are more likely to be successful if the number of property 
owners involved is small. Small number exchanges minimize transaction costs and 
facilitate exchanges, but can lead to the formation of monopolies and/or monopsonies 
hampering market mechanisms. The administration’s role is to establish market rules, 
promote them, and facilitate communication and training to all actors involved (Micelli, 
2002). 
Local government officials tend to favor growth management techniques because 
they help redirect growth at lower cost when compared to command-and-control 
instruments. Daniels (1991) argues that, when development pressures are intense, 
zoning may not be sufficient to preserve land, and TDR programs are a less expensive 
tool to accomplish preservation goals. Furthermore, TDR programs allow local officials 
to minimize commitment costs because once the development rights are severed from 
the property to preserve, they are not easily reattached. Hence, commitment to 
preservation is more credible through TDR programs than through traditional zoning. 
The fact that TDR is a market-based technique to manage growth does not mean that 
it reduces growth. Using a model of urban zoning with TDRs, Levinson (1997) shows it 
is possible that the overall level of development may actually increase rather than 
decrease. Frequently, this happens because decision makers choose the method of rights 
allocation before determining the total amount of development adequate for the 
jurisdiction (Machemer et. al., 1999). However, TDR should not be employed having 
reduction of the level of development as a primary goal. The design and implementation 
of TDR programs has shown that communities are usually interested in preserving 
specific areas, and this goal can be effectively accomplished using TDR without 
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concern for the effect on the overall amount of development. As a consequence, 
developers are likely supportive of TDR programs because other land use management 
policies such as open space zoning, purchase of development rights, and the 
establishment of population and/or building caps are more damaging to their interests. 
The support for TDR programs also comes from environmental interest groups 
committed to the preservation of open space, agricultural areas, wetlands, and historic 
buildings. Environmental interest groups prefer mandatory programs to voluntary ones, 
since the former are more likely to secure land preservation. They argue that voluntary 
programs work in an ad-hoc fashion and perform worse in the preservation of 
contiguous land parcels or tracts. 
Many opponents to TDR programs contend that higher densities generate social 
problems and by allowing construction at higher densities in areas previously zoned for 
single-family housing, local governments are choosing to integrate different housing 
types, which may create marketability problems. Tetreault (2000) points out that, unless 
the demand in the housing market is low, there is no reason to fear this problem and 
difficulties can be overcome by investing in “…creative and attractive community 
design…” (p.2). Nevertheless, these are possible explanations for why certain groups 
may oppose TDR. 
Transfer of development rights and density bonuses are politically and 
programatically appealing to local officials (Wiewel, Persky, and Sendzik, 1999) and 
used frequently as a means to preserve land and provide amenities at lesser cost, in 
situations where local governments are faced with fiscal stress. If the government is 
experiencing financial difficulties, developers may be required to provide other 
amenities in addition to the authorization to use DR in the receiving area. For example, 
local jurisdictions may require that developers use a number of DR in combination with 
the provision of a certain percentage of affordable housing in order to obtain the density 
bonus. 
The approval of a density bonus involves a negotiation process between local 
officials and developers where electoral goals and profit maximization are the prime 
factors affecting the outcome. Because many of the consequences and costs of density 
bonuses are not immediately visible, local officials may be driven to provide “too 
much” incentive leading to economically inefficient outcomes. 
Distributive effects of TDR programs can determine the decision of local 
communities and interest groups to support or oppose program enactment and 
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implementation and, ultimately, determine their success. However, other factors can 
play a role in the decision of local governments to adopt a TDR program. The following 
section addresses some of these determinants, which are not directly related to 
distributive consequences of TDR programs. 
 
Additional Determinants of TDR Program Choice 
 
The adoption of TDR programs by local communities is very often triggered by the 
goal of land preservation for agricultural, environmental or historic purposes. 
Regulatory instruments – purchase of development rights, condemnation procedures, 
open space zoning – are expensive ways of accomplishing these goals, since they 
involve land acquisition, high monitoring costs of decisions, and/or expensive court 
actions. From a financial point of view, market-based instruments are attractive ways to 
attain preservation goals, either because they have revenue generating properties 
(Feitelson and Lindsey, 2001) or because they allow great savings in accomplishing the 
same goals of traditional regulatory instruments. TDR programs fit in this latter 
category, by attributing the costs of land preservation to developers, investors, and other 
DR buyers. When communities face fiscal stress, they will be more likely to adopt TDR 
programs to pursue preservation goals. 
TDR programs involve, nonetheless, administrative costs of implementation. 
Authors writing about TDR are almost unanimous in considering it to be a complex 
instrument that requires large administrative capacity by the government of the 
jurisdiction (Feitelson and Lindsey, 2001), especially since it should be adopted in 
conjunction with other land use management instruments (Micelli, 2002). Local 
governments with more technical skills and resources are more likely to implement 
TDR programs. 
Case study evidence indicates that the complexity of use of TDR makes it more 
likely that high income and highly educated populations will favour the adoption of 
TDR in their jurisdiction (Feitelson and Lindsey, 2001). The reason for this support may 
also be a selfish one. Since TDR is likely to increase the price of new housing and 
diminish affordable housing, local populations may regard it has a means to keep low 
income newcomers out and attract only middle and upper class individuals and families. 
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Data and Methods 
 
In the beginning of the year 2002, Richard Feiock and I mailed a survey to land use 
planners and growth managers in all jurisdictions of the state of Florida. The land use 
management survey instrument, entitled “Land Use Planning in Florida: 
Implementation and Impact”, gathered information on local comprehensive planning 
activities of the universe of Florida counties. Most of the independent variables are 
available for all 67 Florida counties. However, the number of county land use planners 
that responded our survey was 47, resulting in a response rate of 70 percent and an “N” 
of 47 observations. The survey allowed us to identify fourteen (14) TDR programs (ten 
voluntary and four mandatory) in place in Florida and use this information to question 
the circumstances under which they were adopted.  
 
Table 1 – Independent Variable Measurement and Predicted Coefficients 
(Dependent Variable: TDR Programs) 
 
Variable Description Expected 
Coefficient 
Sociodemographic Effects   
Density Population per square mile - 
County Growth Rate of population increase (1990-99) + 
Education Percent of population w/ high school degree or higher + 
Environmental Interests Land use planning survey (2002) + 
Developer Interests Real Estate Firm Size (Employees / Firms)  + 
Homeownership Percent of owner occupied households + 
Partisanship Percent Democrat Voters in 1996 Presidential election + 
Institutional Effects   
Form of Election Number of Commissioners elected by District - 
Growth Management Grants  Growth management grants to local governments per 
capita (1998) 
- 
Administrative Capacity Number of full time planning and development personnel + 
 
Table 1 describes the independent variables and expected coefficients of the 
estimation of the model. The data to estimate this model are drawn from several 
sources. The variables measuring socio-demographic effects are available in the 2000 
edition of the Florida Statistical Abstract, with the exception of the environmental 
interests variable, which was collected by the survey instrument referred to above and 
varies from “1” indicating no environmental interest group activity and “5” 
characterizing jurisdictions where environmental interest groups are extremely active. 
Socio-demographic characteristics of county population are expected to reflect citizens’ 
preferences regarding TDR programs. Density and county population growth (1990-
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1999) are included as control variables. All the variables report to 1999, except where 
noted.  
Form of election is measured as the number of county commissioners elected by 
district and data were collected from the Florida Association of Counties website 
(www.fl-counties.com). Data on state growth management grants to local governments 
were obtained at Florida’s Department of Business and Finance 
(http://www.dbf.state.fl.us/audit.html). Administrative capacity is measured as the 
number of full time planning and development personnel employed by the jurisdiction. 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the independent variables. 
 
Table 2 – Independent Variables – Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Socio-demographic Effects     
Density 29.3 15.7 9.2 87.3 
County Growth 24.6 10.2 9.4 57.5 
Education 70.4 9.0 54.5 84.9 
Environmental Interests 4.2 .82 2 5 
Developer Interests 7.9 4.2 3.5 27.4 
Homeownership 75.5 8.0 54.9 86.4 
Partisanship 44.0 6.98 28.3 66.4 
Institutional Effects     
Form of Election 2.7 3.4 0 14 
Growth Management Grants  4.6 5.2 .35 21.37 
Administrative Capacity 9.5 11.9 1 60 
 
The dependent variable used in this analysis has two possible outcomes. Since 
county governments face the choice of adopting (or not adopting) TDR programs, it is 
relevant to predict the likelihood that a county will adopt. The probit model employed 
here allows us to determine the probability that a jurisdiction, given its specific 
characteristics, will choose to adopt3. The probit model is estimated through nonlinear 
maximum likelihood. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard error procedures were 
undertaken to deal with heteroscedasticity and its undesirable consequences 
(underestimation of standard errors and overestimation of t-scores).  
 
Empirical Results 
 
Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients and standard errors for two Probit models. 
The dependent variable in the first model includes all TDR programs adopted (1 = 
adoption; 0 = no adoption), whereas the dependent variable in the second model 
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includes only the adoption of voluntary TDR programs (1 = voluntary program; 0 = 
otherwise). Transfer of development rights programs are more common in Democrat 
counties, with larger administrative capacity, receiving less state growth management 
grants, and where commissioners are elected at-large.  
 
Table 3 - Probit Analysis Estimates 
Dependent Variables: Total TDR Programs and Voluntary TDR Programs 
 
 TOTAL TDR VOLUNTARY TDR 
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. 
Error 
Sociodemographic Effects     
Density -.010 .016 -.031* .019 
County Growth -.010 .038 -.029 .040 
Education .003 .037 .117** .050 
Environmental Interest Groups .120 .409 -.434 .518 
Real Estate Interest Groups .358*** .132 .510*** .123 
Homeownership .023 .049 .006 .057 
Partisanship .084** .040 .098 .088 
Institutional Effects     
Form of Election -.322*** .123 -.698*** .176 
Growth Management Grants -55.48*** 21.07 -71.0*** 20.1 
Administrative Capacity .091** .045 -.118* .063 
Constant -8.828 5.759 -12.2* 7.11 
     
Wald χ2 24.31 40.79 
Probability > χ2 0.006 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.52 0.59 
N 47 47 
*** P < 0.01 
** P < 0.05 
* P< 0.10 
All tests are two-tailed 
  
 
The use of district representation reduces the likelihood of adoption of a TDR 
program,. This may indicate representation of geographic interests in local politics 
makes the types of exchanges and agreements necessary for TDR more difficult to 
achieve. In particular, opposition to TDR is more likely successful if commissioners are 
elected by district rather than at-large, because elected officials are less able to diffuse 
the effects of TDR programs. In other words, TDR programs entail positive or negative 
impacts across different electoral districts, thereby favoring electoral chances of local 
officials running by districts benefiting from TDR and hindering the chances of officials 
running by districts where TDR has negative impacts. 
The negative effect of growth management grants in TDR adoption confirms the 
hypothesis that this market-type transaction is adopted when local jurisdictions face 
fiscal stress situations. Local governments in the state of Florida, especially county 
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governments, are heavily dependent on state growth management grants. When these 
revenues are reduced, county governments will look for less expensive ways to pursue 
land preservation policies. 
The hypothesis that real estate developers favour the adoption of TDR programs is 
fully confirmed. Developers are likely to see in TDR a less threatening instruments to 
their interests. The use of more blunt land use regulation such as population/building 
caps or open space zoning hurts developers’ interests significantly, and explains their 
preference for TDR programs, which may constitute business opportunities for real 
estate firms. The support of homeowners does not receive full empirical support, 
possibly because TDR is frequently a zero sum game in terms of redistributive 
consequences for homeowners. 
 
Conclusions and Future Research 
 
Transfer of development rights (TDR) is a market-based technique employed by 
local governments to preserve from development land with agricultural, environmental 
or cultural value. The growing importance of market-based instruments to preserve land 
and manage growth such as TDR, impact fees or exactions, density bonuses, among 
others, calls for a deeper understanding of the motivations present in the adoption of 
these techniques. 
This work focused on the economic analysis of TDR markets and on the distributive 
consequences of TDR programs. Empirical data from county governments in the state 
of Florida indicates that TDR adoption is mainly influenced by institutional factors such 
as the financial situation and the administrative capacity of local governments. The 
hypothesis that TDR is a less costly preservation technique, but requires larger 
administrative capacity to be implemented is fully confirmed by the model. The analysis 
also suggests that TDR is a complex technique to understand and implement. It requires 
administrative efforts by the enacting government and highly educated communities to 
guarantee successful implementation. 
The analysis also supports the idea that there is not a specific group that completely 
opposes TDR. Transfer of development rights is adopted in counties where real estate 
firm size is larger, which constitutes a strong indicator of support of this policy. The 
evidence regarding homeowners and environmental interest groups is mixed. 
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The preliminary analysis indicates that we have reason to believe that TDR is a 
more consensual land use management instrument than traditional command-and-
control regulation and has potential to be used by other local governments in Europe 
and the United States. Future research should concentrate on collecting systematic data 
on program characteristics to allow further testing of the hypotheses developed here. In 
addition, comparisons between TDR programs should be made to establish which 
characteristics contribute to the successful attainment of program goals.   
 
Notes 
 
1. TDR programs can be single zone or dual zone, depending upon the existence of a 
single area where the transfer occurs between parcels or two areas (one sending another 
receiving) respectively (Johnson and Madison, 1997). Here the analysis is centered in 
dual zone transfer programs. 
2. Maximum restricted value is defined as “the value of the property under the most 
stringent restriction that would be allowed by the courts under the police power” 
(Barrows and Prenguber, 1976: 764). 
3. The estimation of predicted probabilities for several meaningful values of the 
independent variables was made, but the impacts were close to zero and are omitted. 
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